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Revising Employers’ Role in 
Sponsoring and Financing Health 
Insurance and Medical Care 
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health
Globalization of markets is the straw that is breaking the camel’s 
back of employer-fi nanced health insurance in the United States. Gen-
eral Motors’ (GM) CEO Rick Wagoner is perhaps the most visible chief 
executive to declare that the cost of health care must be reallocated 
away from employers and toward workers and the government. In 
2006, Wagoner and his counterparts at Ford and DaimlerChrysler pro-
posed that the federal government assume responsibility for the medical 
costs of the people in the top 1 percent of the health care expenditure 
distribution. Since people with medical expenses in the top 1 percent of 
the population account for about 30 percent of all health care spending 
each year, Wagoner and his colleagues argue for a signifi cant shift in 
how we fi nance health insurance in the United States.1 
GM’s concerns about employee health care expenses are widely 
shared among employers. Between 2000 and 2006, the proportion of 
the nonelderly population (younger than 65) with employer-sponsored 
health insurance (ESI) went from 66.8 percent to 62 percent (Fronstin 
2006). Employment-based health insurance coverage has contracted 
and expanded over the past two decades with changes in the economy, 
but the current decline is larger and faster than in previous periods. 
Moreover, the percentage of fi rms offering health benefi ts fell from 69 
percent in 2000 to 61 percent in 2006 (Claxton, Gil et al. 2006). These 
trends refl ect the rapid rise in health insurance premiums: between 2000 
and 2005 they increased 73 percent (Gabel et al. 2005). The annual 
rates at which premiums grew are much higher than the annual increas-
es in the Consumer Price Index and workers’ wages, and they exceed 
productivity growth rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007; Gabel et 
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al. 2005). Perhaps not surprisingly, companies reacted by attempting to 
hold down increases in their health insurance costs.
Even before 2000, employers were engaged in efforts to hold down 
health insurance costs—some stopped sponsoring coverage, and oth-
ers (generally new companies) opted not to begin sponsoring coverage; 
some shifted to hiring workers on a contractual basis or as temporary 
workers so they would not be eligible for the companies’ health ben-
efi ts; and others increased the employee share of premiums and/or other 
out-of-pocket costs (e.g., the annual deductible or co-payments when 
obtaining care). Although the Census Bureau’s February Employee 
Benefi t and Contingent Worker Supplement to the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) shows little increase in the use of contingent workers be-
tween 2000 and 2005, there is increasing anecdotal evidence of people 
being hired to work as contract or temporary workers or having to be-
come self-employed workers (Swartz 2006).2 Small service fi rms that 
in earlier decades might have been composed of a president and em-
ployees now frequently are organized as “virtual companies” in which 
there is a founder-president and all the other workers are technically 
self-employed associates or consultants. Such contingent work arrange-
ments enable fi rms to avoid providing fringe benefi ts altogether. These 
moves shifted more health care costs onto employees and no doubt 
prevented premiums from rising faster than they did. Yet the concerns 
raised by the chief executives of the “Big Three” automotive makers 
visibly show that the future fi nancing of ESI is far from certain. With 
growing competition from companies abroad, American workers can 
no longer assume that “good jobs” will provide ESI as part of the com-
pensation package. 
This chapter explores the question of what will happen to employ-
er-sponsored health insurance in the next few decades with increased 
global competition. In particular, this chapter focuses on the question 
of how we might share the costs of health care between employers, 
employees, and government (that is, taxpayers). In the next section we 
review why and for whom health insurance has been a component of to-
tal compensation. In the third section we briefl y describe the enormous 
growth in health care spending and health insurance costs over the last 
50 years. It is the rapid rate of growth in these costs, particularly during 
the last decade, that has been causing employers to argue that they can-
not continue to pay as much as they have for ESI. 
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We then examine in the fourth section the effects of both rising 
health insurance costs and global competition on employers and their 
efforts to reduce their ESI costs. The effects are widespread. In the fi fth 
section we turn to the future and consider how the country might reor-
ganize the fi nancing of health insurance. We begin by examining differ-
ent schemes that are being used in three European countries—the Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Switzerland—to compare how other countries 
have chosen to share the costs between employers, workers, and indi-
viduals and companies as taxpayers to the government to help subsidize 
lower-income people. Three principles are then suggested for framing 
how we might share the costs of health insurance among individuals 
and employers. In the sixth section we develop back-of-the-envelope 
estimates of the amount of money spent by private health insurance and 
other sources for the medical care of the nonelderly in 2005. We use this 
as a starting point to estimate how that sum could be fi nanced through 
premiums and different taxes on individuals and companies rather than 
the current system of employer and employee payments. 
In the concluding section, we discuss the benefi ts of increased eq-
uity and effi ciency in the economy that would result from restructur-
ing the fi nancing of health insurance, along with the fact that private 
insurance plans can still exist. Finally, we note that there is an urgency 
to creating a new fi nancing structure—before the global competition 
and rising health insurance costs cause companies to cross a threshold 
where less than half of the nonelderly population have ESI.
HEALTH INSURANCE AS PART OF COMPENSATION 
FOR WORK: WHO PAYS?
Economic theory suggests that workers will accept fringe benefi ts 
in lieu of part of their wages if the value of the fringe benefi ts is at least 
equal to the value of the forgone wages. This implies that workers are 
paying for health insurance by giving up some of what they otherwise 
would have received as higher wages and salary. The tax code treatment 
of the share of health insurance premiums paid by employers slightly 
complicates the simple trade-off between wages and health insurance 
provided by an employer. Since 1954, premiums paid by employers (or 
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in the case of self-insured fi rms, the premium equivalents) have been 
treated as nontaxable income by the U.S. tax code (Burman 1994).3 
This means that a dollar of premium paid by the employer, unlike a 
dollar of wages, is not subject to the employer and employee payroll 
taxes for Social Security and Medicare hospital insurance (currently a 
total tax of 15.3 percent) or the employee’s federal and state income tax. 
Avoiding payroll taxes on health insurance premiums provides a strong 
incentive for employers to offer ESI rather than additional wages and 
for workers to want ESI rather than additional wages.4
Yet health insurance is a product that cannot be purchased in small 
incremental amounts, and employers cannot set up different combina-
tions of wages and health benefi ts among different employees. Current 
laws require that employers who offer a fringe benefi t must offer the 
same benefi t to all employees; they cannot distinguish among classes of 
employees by offering different versions of a benefi t to different sets of 
workers. Insurers in turn are unwilling to create many tiers of premium 
classes (the tiers that have come into use are: single person, married 
couple, parent and child[ren], and family headed by two adults) because 
as the number of tiers increases, there is less opportunity for spreading 
risks across all workers in a company. The result is that workers who 
earn quite different wages or salaries pay the same premium for health 
insurance.5 Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible for either 
companies or workers to trade income at the margin for the price of 
health benefi ts for individual workers. Moreover, most employees are 
aware that what they pay out-of-pocket for their share of the premium 
for ESI is signifi cantly less than what they would have to pay for in-
surance in the individual insurance market, particularly if they would 
be paying with after-tax income. Further, ESI policies generally cover 
more health care services and require lower out-of-pocket cost-sharing 
than policies in the individual market. As a result, almost all employ-
ees of large companies either take up ESI if it is offered or have ESI 
through a spouse’s employer (Haas and Swartz 2007). 
Despite the fact that economic theory suggests that employees pay 
for health insurance by forgoing wage and salary income, the common 
public perception is that it is employers that pay. The belief that em-
ployers pay for health insurance has roots in the decade after World 
War II, when unions were agitating for large companies to give them 
a percentage of payroll for union-run social welfare programs, includ-
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ing health insurance. As Klein (2003) has documented in detail, neither 
large insurance companies nor large manufacturing companies wanted 
the unions to run the health plans. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made 
offi cial what was already the standard of the day—unions could not 
run social welfare plans independently of employers, and employers 
could avoid collective bargaining over health insurance by simply an-
nouncing that they were paying for health insurance for the employees. 
The 1950 contract settlements between the United Auto Workers and 
the Big Three automakers—known as the Treaty of Detroit because 
the unions agreed to a fi ve-year contract, reducing the threat of labor 
disruptions—and the subsequent 1955 bargaining agreements further 
solidifi ed the public impression that it was employers that were paying 
for health benefi ts. 
The perception that employers pay for ESI also was bolstered by 
the way in which fi rms use fringe benefi ts, including health insurance, 
to woo or retain workers with desirable skills, especially in a tight labor 
market. Although the large unions in manufacturing and mining ob-
tained health insurance in the 1950s, the growth in ESI coverage in the 
1950s and 1960s occurred especially among white-collar profession-
als. The large manufacturing companies that chose to provide health 
benefi ts to the unions naturally gave the same or better benefi ts to their 
white-collar workers. This set a pattern for nonmanufacturing busi-
nesses—to attract and keep college-educated and other highly skilled 
workers, fringe benefi ts, including health insurance, had to be part of 
the compensation package. White-collar workers who were not self-
employed took it for granted that they would have ESI and treated it as 
an expected perk that the employers provided.
But this part of the history of health insurance as a fringe benefi t 
should be seen not as evidence per se that employers pay for health insur-
ance. Instead, it contributes to the argument that how the premiums are 
shared between companies, workers, and others—principally purchas-
ers of a company’s product and a company’s stockholders—depends on 
the labor market and the market for the product. For example, workers 
who have skills that are in short supply are able to obtain greater com-
pensation because of their bargaining position with employers. When 
the supply of workers exceeds the demand for them (as is often the case 
with people with general skills), the workers are in a weak position for 
obtaining compensation on a par with workers who have skills in short 
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supply. Firms with a predominantly low-wage workforce are much less 
likely to offer ESI because they do not need to increase compensation 
to be able to recruit or retain workers. When “low-wage” companies do 
offer ESI, it is usually because they occupy a niche in which they pro-
vide highly desired customer services and that allows them to shift at 
least some of the benefi t costs to the customers. Starbucks, for example, 
faces strong demand for its lattes and frappuccinos, so it can charge 
relatively high prices for coffee and offer ESI to its low-wage work-
ers. In this case, it is the coffee drinkers who are paying a large share 
of the costs for Starbucks’ employees’ health benefi ts. Thus, it is too 
simplistic to argue that ESI is paid only by either workers or employers. 
Depending on the circumstances, workers, companies, consumers, and 
company stockholders all pay varying shares of the costs. 
Several empirical studies have shown that the costs of fringe benefi ts 
are largely paid by workers (see, for example, Eberts and Stone [1985]; 
Gruber and Krueger [1991]; and Woodbury [1983]). Using differences 
in the timing when 23 states required health insurance policies to cover 
maternity benefi ts before the federal government followed suit in 1978 
(with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act), Gruber estimated the states’ 
mandates’ effects on wages (Gruber 1994). He found that between 59 
and 90 percent of the cost of the mandates was shifted back to workers 
via reduced wages in the states with the mandates, and that the wages of 
married women were particularly reduced relative to the wages of sin-
gle women and married men. But, as Blumberg (1999) has pointed out, 
there has been little research on the wage effects of job-based general 
health insurance, and there is little evidence as to how workers’ wages 
are adjusted to compensate for the costs of the health benefi ts. Thus, 
we do not have a clear picture of the extent or confi guration of how the 
burden of paying for employer-sponsored health insurance is shared be-
tween workers, companies, consumers, and companies’ stockholders. 
Perhaps because it is not clear how much workers pay for ESI, em-
ployer claims that they pay for health benefi ts have been relatively un-
challenged in public discussions of who pays. The tax code treatment 
of the share of health insurance premiums paid by employers reinforces 
the idea that employers pay for health insurance rather than the work-
ers. The fact that what companies pay for health benefi ts is referred to 
as a cost in the same way that other inputs to the company’s produc-
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tion process are costs of production also implies that employers pay for 
health benefi ts.
Thus, for more than 50 years, employer-sponsored group health in-
surance has been viewed as something that employers pay for, not em-
ployees. Given the history of how ESI started, it is somewhat ironic that 
we now fi nd employers wanting to not pay for health benefi ts.
GROWTH IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COSTS
To see why employers are trying to limit what they pay for health 
benefi ts, it is important to understand how much health care has changed 
in the last half-century—how much more medicine can do and how 
much more it costs. In 1960, per capita health care spending in the Unit-
ed States was $944 (in 2005 dollars); by 2005 (the last year for which 
we have data) it was $6,697—a 600 percent increase (Levit et al. 1994). 
During those same 45 years, median family income increased from 
$31,390 to $56,194 (both in 2005 dollars)—a 79 percent increase—and 
productivity in the nonfarm business sector of the country increased by 
160 percent (Council of Economic Advisers 2007, Table B-49, p. 288; 
U.S. Census Bureau n.d.a., Table F-7). A small portion of the increase in 
health care spending per capita is attributable to the aging of the popula-
tion, but the vast majority is due to changes in how we are able to treat 
diseases and conditions (Newhouse 1992, 1993). At the end of World 
War II, it would have been next to impossible for large companies (or 
indeed anyone) to predict that medical care would change so dramati-
cally between the midcentury point and 2000 as to increase health care 
spending per capita by so much more than incomes or productivity. 
In the 1950s, the three biggest causes of death were heart disease, 
cancer, and stroke. People who had these conditions generally did not 
live long. But in the intervening fi ve decades we have made enormous 
progress in combating these diseases. The sharp decline in smoking and 
tobacco use and the recognition that cholesterol increases the risks of 
heart disease and stroke have reduced the incidence of all three, even 
though they remained the leading causes of death in 2006. Yet it is the 
advances in medicine that have contributed the most to the increased 
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survival rates for people diagnosed with these diseases. New drugs, new 
surgical techniques, and new diagnostic testing devices have increased 
life expectancy for people diagnosed with a wide variety of previously 
untreatable illnesses and conditions that are now considered chronic 
illnesses, including renal disease, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclero-
sis, and COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). Advances in 
medicine also have enabled millions of people to have higher quality of 
life when they have conditions ranging from torn ligaments to cataracts 
to HIV to knees or hips that need replacing. But these advances have 
come at a price—Americans now have per capita health care expen-
ditures that are the highest in the world and 50 percent larger than the 
two countries with the next highest per capita spending, Norway and 
Switzerland (Anderson et al. 2006).
Thus, the shift in employer attitudes regarding sponsoring group 
health insurance for workers has to be seen in the context of how dif-
ferent medical care is today compared to what it was 50 or 60 years 
ago. Private industry employers did not anticipate that a fringe benefi t 
that equaled about 1–2 percent of compensation in 1960 would equal 7 
percent in 2006; for state and local governments the growth in the costs 
of health benefi ts was even higher—in 2006, health benefi ts equaled 
10.7 percent of total compensation for their workers (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2007). 
Employers’ Efforts to Slow Health Care Spending
From the 1950s through the 1970s, the set of medical services cov-
ered by most health insurance policies expanded from simply a per 
diem payment for a limited number of hospital days to covering a high 
percentage of the costs for a high number (often unlimited) of hospi-
tal days, physician services, and more diagnostic tests. By the early 
1980s, prescription drug coverage also began to be added to the pack-
age of covered services. The expansion of services covered by health 
insurance was encouraged by the tax treatment of employer payments 
for health insurance, especially as incomes were rising from the 1950s 
through the early 1970s as productivity increased. 
But in the second half of the 1970s, productivity growth stalled, and 
when the country experienced the recession of 1981–1983, employers 
began to actively look for ways to slow the growth in their health care 
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spending. Managed care plans were viewed by employers as a partic-
ularly promising mechanism. The hope was that managed care plans 
would restrict spending by reducing choice of health care providers and 
thereby obtaining discounts in fees from providers. In part because of 
the HMO Act of 1973, which required employers that offered ESI to 
offer an HMO alternative if one were located nearby, the fraction of 
employees at large employers (200 or more employees) who were in 
managed care plans increased from 5 percent in 1984 to 50 percent by 
1993; by 1998, that fraction increased further to 86 percent (Marquis 
and Long 1999). Small fi rms that offered ESI also shifted their work-
ers to managed care plans during this time: by 1995, only 31 percent 
of workers in small fi rms with ESI were enrolled in indemnity plans. 
The growth in health care spending did, in fact, slow during the early to 
mid-1990s, although it is now widely believed that the slowdown was 
not a direct result of managed care per se. 
Workers, however, were not happy with managed care plans’ re-
strictions on which medical care providers they could see. By the late 
1990s, with a very tight labor market and a booming economy, employ-
ers worked with managed care plans to develop alternative plan struc-
tures that permitted greater choice of providers. Perhaps in part because 
of fewer restrictions on providers, but more likely because of the large 
number of new prescription drugs that came on the market in the late 
1990s, as well as advances in arthroscopic surgical techniques and ra-
diological scanning, health care spending resumed its higher growth 
rates after 2000.  
An unintended consequence of the shift to managed care plans was 
that a very large share of the population became used to “fi rst-dollar” 
coverage—that is, they paid only a nominal co-payment when they 
sought medical care and faced no other co-payment or deductible. Be-
fore managed care became so widespread, the vast majority of insured 
Americans had indemnity insurance coverage. Indemnity policies re-
quired the insured individual to pay out-of-pocket for the fi rst $100 or 
more of medical care each year (the deductible) and then usually 20–30 
percent of all allowed (insured) medical expenses above the deductible. 
A generation of the working age population has lost the idea of insur-
ance as protection against catastrophic medical expenses. The result is 
that if they do not expect to use much medical care in the coming year, 
they view the current levels of premiums as being excessive. This is 
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especially true among young and healthy individuals who have to pay 
most or all of the premium themselves because they are employees of 
small fi rms or are self-employed. It helps explain why people who used 
to be employed within companies but now are self-employed and work-
ing on contracts are not buying individual insurance.
More Reliance on Cost-Sharing of Medical and Insurance Costs
Since the pullback from relying on managed care to slow the growth 
in health care spending, employers have shifted their efforts toward im-
posing more costs of medical care on individuals and creating health 
plans that also involve more management of diseases and conditions. 
Almost all employers with more than 500 employees now are self-in-
sured, and they have been especially active in developing plans that 
contain deductibles of $500 (or more) per person and payment incen-
tives to the insurers if they meet benchmarks for preventive care and 
disease management. In addition, co-payments for offi ce visits and 
emergency room visits have doubled since 2001 for most people with 
preferred provider organization (PPO) types of health plans (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). By increasing the use of deductibles (as well as 
the dollar amount of deductibles) and adopting higher co-payments for 
physician offi ce visits and diagnostic tests, employers have likely pre-
vented premiums from rising more than they did.6 
Some employers also increased the fraction of the premium for 
which employees are responsible, particularly for family policies. While 
on average the employee shares of premiums for individual and family 
policies have not changed much since 2000, there is substantial varia-
tion in the fraction paid by employees. In 2006, the average employee 
share of premiums was 16 percent for individual coverage and 27 per-
cent for family coverage. But, depending on the size of the fi rm some-
one works for and the fraction of workers who are low-wage within the 
fi rm, a worker can pay very different shares of the premium (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). Yet for all the efforts by employers to increase the 
cost-sharing by employees for health care costs, ESI premiums rose 
an average of 73 percent between 2000 and 2005 and an average of 68 
percent between 2001 and 2006 (Claxton, Gabel et al. 2006; Gabel et 
al. 2005). 
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It is in this context that companies facing competition from abroad 
are especially concerned about their ability to continue to pay for health 
care costs. Although the European Union countries fi nance their health 
insurance systems with a combination of worker-individual premiums 
(or taxes) and employer contributions largely based on payroll taxes, a 
key point is that EU countries have signifi cantly lower per capita health 
costs than the United States. Thus, employer payments for health in-
surance in the EU are lower than they are in the United States. With 
the exception of Japan, Asian and Latin American countries generally 
do not require employers to contribute much if anything to the health 
care costs of their workers. For many U.S. fi rms, the choice is therefore 
to move their operations to lower-wage countries—with far lower em-
ployer payments to health care costs—or to radically restructure their 
role with ESI here. 
RIPPLE EFFECTS OF RISING HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS
While it is clear that companies facing direct competition from 
abroad are most sensitive to the increasing health insurance costs, the 
twin effects of rising health insurance costs and globalization are more 
nuanced and widespread among employers of all sorts in the United 
States. 
Manufacturing Was the Beginning
Although manufacturing was the fi rst industrial sector to be seen 
as losing to the lower wage workforces in Asia and Latin America, it 
slowly became apparent that what enabled goods to be made abroad 
was the expansion of relatively inexpensive and fast transportation. 
Containers that could be loaded up at the factory and then quickly load-
ed onto trucks, ships, or airplanes dramatically reduced shipping time 
between countries (Levinson 2006). Then, with the advent of the Inter-
net and global computer communications by the early 1990s, suddenly 
shipping time for services that rely on electronic transmission was the 
same within the United States as across the world—and it wasn’t just 
manufacturing that could be done more cheaply overseas. Many types 
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of services can now be provided by people in other countries who are 
paid less than Americans. These services range from call centers taking 
reservations to software engineers who may be located 6–12 time zones 
from other workers but can take advantage of the time difference and 
the Internet to jointly work on new software programs. 
Companies that have been most obviously affected by foreign com-
petition are in manufacturing; many of these companies and industries 
had both aging production equipment and aging workforces (so-called 
legacy workforces)—automobiles, steel, durable appliances, and tex-
tiles/clothing are the prime examples. Those industries have been 
through several episodes of wrenching downsizing of their companies, 
and will experience more such downsizing in the coming decade. 
Services Sector Industries and Small Firms
The growth in employment in the United States since the mid-1980s 
has been in construction and the services sector, especially fi nancial 
services, professional and business services, education and health-re-
lated services, and entertainment and leisure services (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics n.d.; Council of Economic Advisers 2005; Swartz 2006, Fig-
ure 2.2, p. 22). Although some of these industries may seem insulated 
from foreign competition because they cater to individuals and sell their 
services to American companies, they are not insulated from the pres-
sures to keep labor costs low. Rising health insurance costs are there-
fore a target in the efforts to keep labor costs competitive. Electronic 
transmission of information has enabled many service industries to ship 
or threaten to ship some of their jobs offshore, essentially reducing em-
ployee bargaining power in wage negotiations. 
At the same time, while manufacturing was dominated by large 
companies until very recently, the dominant type of fi rm in construction 
and the services sector is small (fewer than 50 employees). Growth in 
employment in these industries explains why, since 1979, a rising share 
of the private sector workforce has been employed by fi rms with fewer 
than 50 workers.7 In 2005, 43 percent of the private sector workforce 
was employed by small fi rms; in 1979 it was 37 percent. 
For many years, small fi rms have been far less likely to offer ESI 
than large fi rms: 36 percent of fi rms with less than 10 employees offer 
ESI and 66 percent of fi rms with 10 to 24 employees offer ESI, com-
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pared with 95 percent of fi rms with more than 100 employees (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2003, Table 1.A.2). Small fi rms 
face much higher premiums per person than do large fi rms because 
they have to buy policies underwritten by insurers; they do not have 
the fi nancial resources to self-insure their employees’ health care costs. 
Insurers have to account for the risk of adverse selection in the small 
group market when they price small group policies, and the risk in-
creases as the size of the fi rm shrinks. Insurers’ concern with adverse 
selection is that small fi rms that apply for coverage without buying 
other types of insurance (for example, life insurance) are more likely 
to be owned by someone who either has a health problem within his 
or her family or knows something about the health needs of a favorite 
employee. Until the 1990s, when a substantial fraction of large employ-
ers became self-insured, insurers could use their large-group insurance 
policies to cross-subsidize the higher risks in the small group insurance 
part of their business. Today, most insurers do not underwrite the health 
care costs of large employers; instead they are paid to be administra-
tors of self-insured large companies. This change has helped drive up 
insurance costs for small fi rms even faster than the increase in premium 
equivalents among self-insured large fi rms. Thus, the last two decades’ 
shift in private sector employment to the service sector and smaller 
fi rms coincided with a change in the insurance business that increased 
the costs of small fi rms’ health insurance policies—at the very time that 
worries about foreign low-wage labor started rising. 
Small businesses also typically have short lifetimes; many are small 
retail shops, restaurants, and service businesses that have an average 
tenure of two years. When any business starts up, it is short on cash—
revenues lag behind start-up costs. Although many small businesses 
may want to offer health benefi ts, the more than doubling of premium 
costs since 2000 contributes to small fi rms’ decisions not to offer insur-
ance. They are reluctant to offer a benefi t that they suspect they will not 
be able to afford within three years. 
Finally, many service sector fi rms may not face direct competition 
from overseas but they supply services to companies that are facing 
foreign competition, which keeps up the pressure to reduce costs. Firms 
in the professional and business services, for example, work with com-
panies that compete with international fi rms, and these service fi rms are 
constantly looking for ways to reduce their labor costs so they will not 
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lose business. Among small professional services fi rms, it is not uncom-
mon now to fi nd “virtual” fi rms, where a person who has a reputation 
for client service obtains a contract for a service that actually requires 
several people to do the job, and then the person goes to other self-
employed people he or she has worked with in the past and gives them 
contracts to work on the job at hand. A decade or more ago, these people 
would all have been in-house employees of large companies with ESI. 
But because the services they provide are not “core competency” func-
tions, they now have to sell their services as independent contractors. 
Increasing numbers of people in software development, information 
technology in general, marketing consulting, advertising and writing, 
and a host of professional business support activities are such contract 
workers, and they do not have employer-group health insurance. 
Service Companies with Large Numbers of Low-Wage Workers
A different type of ripple effect caused by fears of foreign competi-
tion exists in service industries with high numbers of low-wage and low-
skilled workers—for example, the entertainment industry, protective 
services, food processing, and long-term care health services. Global-
ization has meant the movement of low-wage labor from other countries 
to these industries in the United States, in contrast with the movement 
of manufacturing to countries with lower-wage workers. Many service 
sector fi rms do not need to offer ESI to attract workers since there has 
been a steady supply of workers with the general skills needed for such 
fi rms. In the past, low-skilled workers might have organized to demand 
higher wages and fringe benefi ts such as ESI, but with a steady infl ux 
of immigrant workers willing to work for low wages, they have been 
reluctant to organize to demand higher wages and fringe benefi ts. Such 
workers know that other recent immigrants will be willing to take their 
place for the same low wages and lack of health insurance. Similarly, 
service-sector fi rms with low-wage workers know that if they were to 
provide ESI, they would be underbid in competition for contracts by 
fi rms with lower labor costs because they do not offer ESI. 
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Effects of Demographic Changes on Employers’ Health 
Insurance Costs
The decline in ESI coverage, especially among workers in the 
25–34-year-old and 35–44-year-old age cohorts, is coming at the same 
time that the demographics of the U.S. population are marked by the 
baby boomers in the older half of the workforce. The baby boomer co-
hort is currently 44–61 years old and consists of about 73.5 million 
people. The cohorts just behind them are 25–34 and 35–44 years old, 
and they include almost the same number of people: 70.3 million (U.S. 
Census Bureau n.d.b.). Roughly 10.5 million of the baby boomers are 
uninsured, but 18.3 million of the 25–44-year-olds are uninsured. With 
sharply smaller numbers of younger adults covered by ESI, the em-
ployers that do offer health benefi ts are facing higher premiums (or 
premium equivalents if they are self-insured) in part because so many 
younger workers are not part of the risk pool. When the baby boomers 
were younger, they had low levels of health care spending (as is typical 
of younger adults) and cross-subsidized the relatively smaller numbers 
of older workers in their fi rms. Today, that degree of cross-subsidization 
within fi rms no longer exists.
The demographic shift among workers also has reinforced com-
panies’ decisions to limit their fi nancial obligations for retiree health 
benefi ts. (Abraham and Houseman [2008] have a more detailed discus-
sion in Chapter 5 of how retiree health benefi ts are likely to change in 
the next decade.) Since 1988, the fraction of companies with 200 or 
more employees that are offering retiree health insurance has declined 
sharply, from 66 percent to 33–35 percent in 2005 and 2006 (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). The catalyst for this decline, most of which occurred 
by 1993, is widely believed to be a change in how the future costs of 
retiree benefi ts are to be accounted for in companies’ fi nancial state-
ments. The non-governmental Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) required that companies show the expected future retiree health 
benefi t costs as liabilities on their fi nancial statements for fi scal years 
beginning after December 15, 1992. (As of 2007, larger state and lo-
cal governments also are required to show liabilities for future ben-
efi ts on statements; smaller government units have an additional two 
years to meet the new rules. These employers, too, are under fi nancial 
strain because of inadequately funded future obligations and concerns 
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about funding for current employees.8) Since 2000, the percentage of 
medium and large fi rms offering retiree health benefi ts has been vacil-
lating between 33 and 38 percent, with most of those companies that do 
offer retiree benefi ts being large or older fi rms in particular industries. 
But because newer fi rms are particularly likely to have large shares of 
younger workers and have not offered retiree health benefi ts, their low-
er labor cost structure is putting pressure on those companies that do 
provide retiree health benefi ts. They are cutting back on retiree health 
benefi t provisions for people who were hired within the last 10 years 
and/or limiting the company’s fi nancial obligations for such benefi ts 
in the future.9 Recent surveys of employers and retirees also show that 
a rising number of companies are shifting the rising costs of retiree 
health benefi ts onto the retirees. Thus, over the last decade especially, 
companies became quite conscious of retiree health benefi ts costs and 
the adverse effects of having an aging workforce. The FASB accounting 
rules changes for retiree health benefi ts reinforced companies’ unease 
about the rising costs of offering health benefi ts to active workers as 
well as retirees. 
Large and long-standing companies are particularly likely to have 
high fractions of their workforces who are baby boomers. Much has 
been made of the Big Three automakers’ legacy workforce (and re-
tiree health benefi ts costs) and how foreign-owned car manufacturers 
that produce cars in the United States—with their younger American 
workers—have much lower health benefi ts costs per car made in the 
United States.10 It is not surprising that many production workers at 
large companies are now hired on a contingent basis (Dey, Houseman, 
and Polivka 2007). They are paid on a lower pay-scale and are not per-
manent employees, so the companies do not pay benefi ts. For the large 
self-insured fi rms, this strategy allows output per worker to be obtained 
at a lower labor cost. But when these fi rms report the costs of health 
benefi ts per employee, they are focusing just on their aging workforce 
and do not include the contingent workers who would cost much less if 
they also had health benefi ts.
For smaller companies that are not large enough to self-insure, the 
decline in younger workers covered by true health insurance policies 
means that small group health insurance premiums are rising faster in 
part because the pool of people with such policies are aging. This fur-
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ther increases the pressures on small businesses to stop offering health 
benefi ts. 
Thus, it would be incorrect to conclude that it is the large companies 
in the United States that have been most affected by the rising costs 
of health insurance and intensifi ed competition due to globalization. 
Instead, the effects are widespread, with ripples expanding throughout 
the economy and with the greatest effects on younger adult cohorts. It 
is increasingly clear that our system of private health insurance built on 
employer-sponsored coverage is under pressure from rising health care 
costs and global competition and is unraveling in many directions.
RECONFIGURING HOW WE PAY FOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE: WHAT MIGHT EMPLOYERS PAY?
With employers moving to reduce their exposure to the costs of 
health care, it is increasingly likely that a large fraction of the U.S. 
workforce soon will not have ESI as we have known it in the second 
half of the twentieth century. People with highly sought-after skills may 
still obtain health insurance as a fringe benefi t. But a rapidly increasing 
number of jobs that are currently considered good jobs will not have 
ESI as part of the compensation or will include only a defi ned contribu-
tion to help pay for health benefi ts. 
This is a sea change in the American employment relationship.11 
The change provides an opportunity for reconfi guring the fi nancing of 
health insurance so there can be more equity in how much people with 
the same income pay for health coverage. But the opportunity comes 
with an urgent need to devise a new fi nancing structure quickly, ahead 
of the market changes being driven by companies’ responses to in-
creased globalization and rising health insurance costs. 
As a starting place for restructuring the fi nancing of health insur-
ance, it is useful to see what several European countries have done re-
cently to reconfi gure their fi nancing of health insurance. Many people 
in the United States regard other countries’ health insurance systems, 
especially those in Europe, as being nationalized systems with a single 
payer and all health care providers as employees. This is not the case, 
however. A number of countries have private health insurance plans (or, 
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as many Europeans call them, sickness funds) that compete with one 
another for enrollees. The countries collect funding for the insurance 
from a variety of sources and generally funnel the revenues to a cen-
tral government fund that then disperses the funds to the health plans. 
The central government fund also is used to subsidize lower-income 
people’s payments and in some cases to adjust the payments to refl ect 
the expected higher costs of older or sicker individuals. 
How Three Other Countries Finance Health Insurance
The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland are the three European 
Union countries with the highest percent of GDP spent on health care 
in 2003: Switzerland had 11.5 percent, Germany 11.1 percent, and the 
Netherlands 9.8 percent (Anderson et al. 2006). While they spend less 
per person than the United States (which spent 15 percent of GDP on 
health care in 2003 and 16 percent in 2005), all three countries changed 
their health insurance systems and fi nancing structures within the past 
decade. They also all rely on private health insurance plans, providing 
useful examples of how we might consider alternative structures for 
fi nancing U.S. health insurance. 
The Netherlands implemented its changes on January 1, 2006 (De-
Jong and Mosca 2006; Prinsze and van Vliet 2008). Everyone in the 
country is covered for basic services; people can purchase additional 
coverage if they want. There are 33 health insurers (some of which 
are for-profi t) that compete for enrollment. They cannot turn away any 
applicant for basic services although they can deny coverage for sup-
plemental policies. People can choose between plans that do and do 
not have deductibles; those with deductibles have lower premiums.12 
Everyone pays a nominal premium that depends on which plan they 
choose (in 2006, the average was 1,050 euros, or about $1,500). In ad-
dition to the premium, employers pay a payroll tax of 6.5 percent on 
their employees’ income up to 30,105 euros (about $43,050), or a maxi-
mum tax of about 2,000 euros ($2,860) per year.13 Self-employed people 
and retirees pay 4.4 percent of their income. Low-income people can 
apply for a subsidy, which is dependent on a person’s income. About 
30 percent (5 million people) of the population receive such subsidies. 
The health insurance costs of children under age 18 are viewed as the 
responsibility of the country, so parents do not explicitly pay for their 
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children’s health plans, although the children enroll in whichever plan 
the parents choose. The Dutch also reward people who have no medical 
expenses in a year with up to 255 euros in rebates.14 The Dutch have 
long had a tradition of community-rated premiums, which continues 
under the revised health insurance system. To compensate insurers that 
might experience high numbers of enrollees with high medical costs, 
the Dutch are continuing their use of a risk adjustment mechanism that 
they have been expanding since 1992 and that provides risk-adjustments 
to the premiums. As a result, insurers receive a risk-adjustment from a 
central (federal) fund according to the risk characteristics of the people 
who enrolled in the plan. (The risk characteristics are a mix of simple 
demographic characteristics and recent medical care use factors.) 
Germany requires that all people with annual incomes below about 
47,250 euros ($67,570) participate; about 10 percent of the population 
is exempt from the social system. Employees pay 7.5 percent of their 
salaries (up to 47,250 euros) and employers pay 6.6 percent of their 
workers’ salaries (up to 47,250 euros) for insurance. For the compul-
sory insurance, children and nonworking spouses are covered “free of 
charge”; there are no distinctions between individual and family poli-
cies. However, in the private insurance system, family members are 
charged separately. Private insurance premiums are set to refl ect the 
expected risk of individuals, and the insurance companies can turn peo-
ple down for coverage. (The insurance companies have full access to a 
person’s medical records.) Germany is very concerned about stabilizing 
the fi nancing of its health care system and reducing the costs of labor in 
order to increase German companies’ competitiveness. 
Switzerland implemented changes to its health insurance system in 
1996. It now requires that everyone enroll in a health insurance plan. 
(Like the United States, there were fi erce debates about mandating cov-
erage, but since the law was passed, there has been widespread accep-
tance of the requirement [Noble 2007].) Insurance plans compete on 
premiums—like the Dutch system—but not on services provided. Like 
the Dutch, everyone has basic coverage and can purchase supplemental 
coverage if they want; they do not have to buy the supplemental and 
basic policies from the same insurance plan. (There were 93 insurance 
plans in 2004.) Premiums are community rated by canton for the man-
datory basic package of benefi ts, and there is considerable variation in 
the premiums by canton. This has created disparities by income since 
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people are restricted to buying their coverage within the cantons where 
they live. Insurers cannot reject someone who applies for the basic cov-
erage but they can reject applicants for the supplemental policies. Most 
people have the same insurer for both plans, leading some to speculate 
that people are afraid to change basic plan insurers for fear that their 
premium for the supplemental policy might then increase signifi cantly. 
To reduce the income consequences of per capita premiums, the fed-
eral government and the canton government subsidize the premiums 
for basic coverage through tax-fi nanced, means-tested subsidies. Other 
than paying taxes to the federal and canton governments, companies do 
not pay for the fi nancing of health insurance. In 1996, the expectation 
was that people would pay no more than 6 percent of their tax-adjusted 
income for health insurance, but it appears that a majority of people are 
now paying 8–10 percent of income.
Principles for Financing Health Insurance
The recent experiences of these three countries offer suggestions 
for how we might think about fi nancing the costs of health insurance in 
the United States. Most importantly, they provide a set of principles that 
ought to govern how we share the costs among various interested par-
ties. Three principles stand out. First, everyone is required to enroll in 
a health insurance plan that covers a basic set of services, and everyone 
pays at least a nominal premium. Second, the countries all subsidize 
lower-income people via taxes that fl ow to a central, federal fund. The 
Dutch further adjust the premium payments that go to the private insur-
ance plans with risk adjustments based on a person’s age, gender, and 
prior medical history. These risk adjustments also come from the taxes 
collected by the federal government. Third, companies help pay for the 
health insurance. Of the three countries, only Switzerland does not tax 
companies specifi cally for health insurance; however, the companies do 
pay taxes that are part of the general revenues used to subsidize lower-
income people’s premiums. 
We could apply these same principles to a new fi nancing system 
for health insurance in the United States. Requiring everyone to enroll 
in a health insurance plan and setting a nominal premium for every 
person implies that individuals have an obligation to participate in a so-
cial compact such as health insurance. Moreover, requiring everyone to 
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contribute at least a small amount toward the costs of their health care 
reinforces the social compact of sharing risk for high health costs while 
simultaneously signaling that everyone is entitled to access to health 
care. Collecting additional revenues from individuals in proportion to 
their family income ensures that no person or family pays more than 
what is deemed an affordable percent of income, and that higher-income 
people contribute to the subsidization of lower-income people. Such a 
system also creates equity in that people with the same levels of income 
pay the same amount toward health insurance. Our current system does 
not have this equity. Premiums for health insurance depend primarily 
on the number and age distribution of a person’s fellow workers.
Requiring companies also to contribute to the fi nancing of health in-
surance is part of the social compact. Companies benefi t tremendously 
from having a healthy workforce, and it seems reasonable therefore that 
they also should contribute to the fi nancing of health care. Since (as we 
discussed earlier) not all companies actually hire people as their own 
employees, it is important that companies be the organizational entities 
that are required to contribute to the fi nancing of health insurance and 
not just “employers.” Companies might share in the fi nancing of health 
care in a myriad of ways. For example, payments could be based on 
payroll, the number of employees (both those who are on the compa-
ny’s payroll and those who are there as temporary or contract workers), 
profi ts, or the value added by the company. Given our concern with the 
future of jobs in America, it is important that the fi nancing mechanism 
for companies’ contributions not contain incentives for companies to 
reduce the number of people working for them. 
As we discussed earlier, the common perception is that employers 
pay most of the costs of health insurance. But as we also discussed, the 
costs are shared among workers, companies, consumers, and company 
stockholders, and the actual shares are determined by the markets for 
the labor used by the company and the product produced by the com-
pany. Embedded in the three principles are a notion of a social compact 
and a desire for equity in how the fi nancing will be shared among in-
dividuals and companies. The social compact involves a responsibil-
ity to participate in the health insurance system—we all benefi t from a 
system that ensures access to health care and we all have to contribute 
to that system. Further, subsidies to make sure people in weaker eco-
nomic circumstances have a basic level of insurance are part of the 
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social compact. Equity requires both that people in the same economic 
position pay the same amount and that companies contribute equally on 
whatever metric is chosen for determining company payments. 
Note that these principles would permit basic health insurance cov-
erage to be disconnected from where one works—basic insurance would 
be portable across jobs. This would increase the effi ciency of the labor 
market in terms of sorting people to jobs where their talents might best 
be used. Although the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was intended to minimize “job lock” caused by 
workers’ concerns about losing health insurance if they changed jobs, 
people still have such concerns. Reconfi guring health insurance fi nanc-
ing so that a person’s benefi ts did not depend on a particular company 
would eliminate the ineffi ciencies in labor market sorting and increase 
overall labor productivity. 
FUNDS NEEDED FOR U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE: 
HOW MIGHT THEY BE REAPPORTIONED?
We can do a back-of-the-envelope estimate of how health insurance 
fi nancing would need to be distributed across all sources by examining 
recent health care expenditures by private health insurance and other 
private funds that fi nanced care for the uninsured. Such expenditures 
would be covered by health insurance if we structure the fi nancing such 
that everyone has health insurance. Note that almost all of this spending 
already is fi nanced by employers and individuals, so in restructuring 
how we would pay for health insurance, we do not need to raise new 
monies other than what would be needed to cover the uninsured who 
need subsidies. Also, since we are interested in how we might restruc-
ture the fi nancing for private health insurance, we will exclude health 
care spending paid for by Medicare and Medicare supplemental insur-
ance, Medicaid, and the military health care system. 
In 2005, the last year for which we have national health spending 
data, the United States spent a total of almost $2 trillion on health care 
(Catlin et al. 2007). We will use the fi nancing sources in 2005 for our 
estimates, which are shown in Table 3.1. Of the $2 trillion, a little more 
than half (55 percent) was purchased with private funds (out-of-pock-
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et spending by consumers, private health insurance, and other private 
funds). Private health insurance accounted for almost $700 billion. This 
includes spending paid by Medicare supplemental health insurance pol-
icies, however. If we assume that 20 percent of the spending fi nanced 
by private health insurance came from Medicare supplemental policies, 
then approximately $560 billion was paid by private health insurance 
for the nonelderly (line 3 of Table 3.1).15 This does not include admin-
istrative costs associated with health insurance—it simply tells us how 
much private health insurance policies paid out for health care services. 
Since the costs of billing and insurance-related administrative activi-
ties need to be included in our estimate of insurance costs, we could 
estimate those costs as 10–15 percent of what is collected in premium 
revenues (Kahn et al. 2005). That is, the $560 billion of health care 
spending for the nonelderly paid by private insurance would equal 85–
90 percent of premium revenues. This suggests that premium revenues 
for private insurance for the nonelderly were almost $622–$660 billion 
in 2005 (line 4 of Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1  Estimate of Health Care Spending That Would Have Been 
Paid by Private Insurance in 2005 for the Nonelderly Who 
Are Not Covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Military 
Health Care System, Using 2005 Health Care Expenditures 
(for illustrative purposes only)
Type of spending and assumption $ (billions)
(1) Total U.S. health care spending 2,000
(2) Paid by private health insurance
Less 20% paid by Medicare supplemental
700
−140
(3) Paid by private health insurance for nonelderly 
Plus administrative costs: 10–15% of revenues
560
+ 62 – 100
(4) Total private insurance costs for nonelderly 622 – 660
(5) Out-of-pocket spending 
Retain as out-of-pocket spending
250
−150 – 200
(6) Would be covered by private insurance 50 – 100
(7) Other private funds 140
(8) Would be covered by private insurance 140
(9) Total (2005) spending that would have been 
covered by private insurance
815 – 900
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Out-of-pocket spending on health care in 2005 was about $250 bil-
lion (line 5 of Table 3.1). Out-of-pocket expenditures are generated by 
people with and without health insurance. Uninsured people often pay 
for medical care when they use it (and sometimes they pay more than 
an insured person) (Anderson 2007). Insured people are responsible for 
out-of-pocket expenditures for co-payments (including for prescription 
drugs) and deductibles as well as expenditures for over-the-counter 
medications and medical equipment that are not covered by insurance. 
In addition, some medical services such as mental health or substance 
abuse care often are not covered by health insurance policies, so expen-
ditures for such health care are paid out-of-pocket even by people with 
health benefi ts. We can assume that health insurance is likely to retain 
cost-sharing at the time of seeking medical care, and that a number of 
medical services such as mental health and substance abuse services 
would be covered with limits. Then perhaps between $50 and $100 bil-
lion of what were out-of-pocket expenditures in 2005 would be covered 
by health insurance if all the uninsured were covered (line 6 of Table 
3.1). The $140 billion of health spending in 2005 paid by other private 
funds largely involves charity care, and we could assume that all of 
that spending would be covered by insurance under the new fi nancing 
structure (line 8 of Table 3.1). 
Taking all these spending estimates and assumptions together, the 
total amount of spending that we might have covered by private insur-
ance and that we would have needed to pay for under a new fi nancing 
structure in 2005 is between $815 and $900 billion (line 9 of Table 
1). These expenditures would have been for people who were covered 
by private health insurance or were not insured; that is, they were for 
people who were not covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or military health 
coverage. In 2005, there were 203 million such people (out of a total 
population of 294 million) who generated these expenditures.16 On a 
per capita basis then, the spending fi nanced by insurance would have 
been approximately $4,000–$4,435.
Note that in thinking about how we might reconfi gure the fi nancing 
for health insurance, the new system of premiums and taxes would re-
place payments currently made by individuals and companies for health 
insurance. We would raise a modest amount more from premiums and 
taxes than we now obtain from premiums paid by workers and employ-
ers, but everyone not currently insured would be covered.17
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Distributing the Financing for Health Insurance
How would we restructure the way we fi nance the $815–$900 bil-
lion (in 2005 dollars) for private health insurance? First, recall that 
these funds are not “new” or additional funds that have to be raised 
from individuals and companies. These funds were, in fact, spent on 
health care for the nonelderly in 2005. What we want to create is a new 
arrangement for how these same funds would be raised from a combi-
nation of premiums paid by individuals and taxes paid by individuals 
and companies. The new arrangement would substitute for the premi-
ums individuals and companies are paying now for private insurance as 
well as other private funds that pay for medical care. In the aggregate, 
the amount could be split between workers, companies, people who 
are not employed for pay, and company stockholders, as well as other 
payers of collective taxes raised by the federal government. We can 
assume that anyone with an income below the poverty level would be 
enrolled in Medicaid (or be fully subsidized), and anyone eligible for 
Medicare would be enrolled in Medicare, so we are focused on restruc-
turing how we fi nance the $815–$900 billion for private insurance. We 
might reallocate these costs along the following lines for individuals 
and companies. 
Individuals
First, we could set a nominal annual premium of $1,000 per person; 
this would account for approximately $200 billion. Of course, not ev-
eryone would be able to pay such a premium—subsidies would have to 
be provided to people with family incomes between the poverty level 
and some threshold.18 But $1,000 per year is less than $100 per month, 
and many people who are not eligible for Medicaid should be able to 
pay a sizeable portion of the $1,000. Moreover, the $1,000 per person 
per year is about what most people with employer-sponsored health 
insurance now pay out-of-pocket for their share of the premium, so it 
would not be a new burden for most people.
The remaining $615–$700 billion (plus whatever funds will be need-
ed for the subsidies to the nominal premiums) would be paid by higher-
income people (who include stockholders) and companies. Calculating 
how the members of these two groups might share the responsibility for 
the costs requires estimating sophisticated models of the distribution 
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of income, profi ts and productivity, and taxes paid by individuals and 
companies. More to the point, the distributional consequences of new 
taxes for health insurance must be considered in conjunction with the 
effects of other taxes. It is unlikely that reconfi guring how we might 
fi nance health insurance would be considered without a general review 
of the current tax code.19
Nonetheless, we can use estimates of changes in tax rates to obtain 
rough estimates of how much money might be raised by changes in the 
tax rates. In thinking about these estimates, we need to recall that what 
people and companies are paying now for health insurance would be 
replaced by any new taxes and premiums. Thus, people’s out-of-pocket 
contributions to the total premium for their employer-sponsored cov-
erage would become their tax payments for health insurance. For our 
purposes here, we will make a simplifying assumption that premium 
payments (or premium equivalent payments) by companies for health 
insurance would not be paid as increased income to workers. By as-
suming this, we can ignore the increased tax payments that workers and 
companies would have to pay if such payments became taxable income. 
Moreover, as we discuss below, these payments will shift to payroll 
taxes (or some other tax) that the employers will pay.
Currently, for individuals, the lowest tax rate for ordinary taxable 
income is 10 percent and the highest rate is 35 percent (for income 
above $349,700 in 2007).20 The Congressional Budget Offi ce (2007) 
has estimated the change in revenues that would occur if small changes 
were made in a number of taxes. If all tax rates on ordinary income 
were increased by 1 percentage point, tax revenues would increase by 
$30.3 billion in 2010. If just the top ordinary tax rate were increased by 
1 percentage point, revenues would go up by only $5.5 billion in 2010. 
Thus, it is clear that very small changes in the individual tax rates would 
not yield the magnitude of funds needed. A tax code change that would 
yield somewhat larger revenue increases is to limit the total of itemized 
deductions (for example, state and local income and property taxes, 
home mortgage interest payments, and contributions to charitable in-
stitutions) to 15 percent of a household’s income. This would cause 
tax revenues to increase by $54.7 billion in 2010 and $90.3 billion in 
2011. In contrast to these changes, if the tax cuts enacted since 2001 are 
made permanent, tax revenues will decline by $97.8 billion in 2011 and 
$174.7 billion in 2012. In the face of growing needs for federal dollars, 
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these tax revenue losses could not easily be made up by small changes 
in the tax rates. 
Clearly, for taxes on individuals to fund a substantial share of the 
$615–$700 billion for health insurance, the personal income tax cuts 
of 2001 will have to be rolled back and additional taxes imposed. But 
we are not expecting that individuals will pay all of the $615–$700 bil-
lion—the principles noted earlier include the principle that companies 
should pay substantial amounts of the health insurance costs, too. More-
over, since companies now are paying the majority of health insurance 
costs and we are simply working to restructure how the total costs are 
allocated, we would expect those same dollars to be coming into the fi -
nancing system. The dollars will likely be distributed differently across 
all companies, however, because many companies do not now offer 
ESI as we discussed earlier. The question is, how should those dollars 
be apportioned?
Companies
Corporate income does not appear to be a good basis for taxing 
companies to fi nance health insurance—only about 8 percent of busi-
nesses currently pay corporate income taxes. In July 2006, corporate 
tax receipts for the nine months between September 2005 and June 
2006 were $250 billion (Andrews 2006).21 The corporate income tax 
has been a declining source of federal revenues since 1950. In 1952, 
corporate income tax receipts accounted for almost a third of federal 
tax receipts, but since the 1980s they have accounted for less than 10 
percent (Friedman 2003). 
Payroll taxes have replaced corporate income taxes as a substantial 
source of federal tax revenues. In 1952, they accounted for 10 percent of 
all federal tax receipts, but in 2003, the fraction was 40 percent (Fried-
man 2003). The second largest payroll tax paid by companies is that for 
the Medicare Part A Trust Fund, also known as the Medicare Hospital 
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. The Medicare payroll tax is 1.45 percent 
and it applies to all employee earnings paid by an employer (there is no 
maximum on what is taxable income); individual workers also pay a tax 
of 1.45 percent on their wages and salary, so the combined Medicare HI 
tax rate is 2.9 percent of earnings.22 In 2006, the Medicare HI payroll 
tax revenues were $211.5 billion—half paid by companies and half paid 
by workers (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 2007). 
tb08fogjch3.indd   107 9/10/2008   12:43:43 PM
108   Swartz
This provides an estimate of the amount of fi nancing we could raise 
from employers if we were to use a payroll tax: a tax paid by employers 
of almost 3 percent of payroll in 2006 would have raised about $215 
billion and a tax of 6 percent would have raised about $430 billion. To 
put this in perspective, a payroll tax of 6 percent would have raised at 
least 60 percent of the $615–$700 billion needed in 2005.
There are benefi ts and costs to using a payroll tax for obtaining 
company fi nancing for health insurance. The costs are that a payroll tax 
raises the costs of labor, providing an incentive for companies to look 
for cheaper ways of producing their products, most likely involving less 
labor. However, the payroll tax needs to be seen in the context of how 
much many companies are now paying for ESI; a 6 percent payroll tax 
is on average what companies that provide employer-sponsored health 
insurance are paying now. Equally important, it is likely to be less ex-
pensive than what companies expect health insurance premiums will 
cost them later this decade. The other cost associated with using a pay-
roll tax to collect health insurance fi nancing from companies is that an 
increasing number of workers are not technically employees of a com-
pany—they are hired through temporary agencies or contract houses or 
are self-employed and have a contract to do a specifi c task. They are 
not part of the payroll for which companies pay taxes. If a payroll tax 
is used to obtain fi nancing from companies, then it needs to apply to 
companies that hire people as contingent workers as well. 
The primary benefi t from using a payroll tax is that it redistributes 
the costs of employer fi nancing of health insurance so that all employ-
ers are paying for health insurance. Large companies with legacy work-
forces will no longer be paying signifi cantly more for ESI than their 
competitors with younger workforces. Further, the payroll tax creates a 
progressive tax across companies relative to company payrolls—com-
panies with low-wage workers would pay less than companies with 
high-income workers, so companies with high margins would subsidize 
companies with low margins.
Summary of Distributing the Financing across Individuals 
and Companies
In sum, if we had been fi nancing private health insurance for the 
nonelderly in 2005, we would have needed between $815 and $900 bil-
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lion. An annual per person premium of $1,000 paid by everyone who 
was not enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare would have raised about 
$200 billion. The remaining $615–$700 billion would then have been 
shared by individual taxpayers and companies. If companies exchange 
what they are paying now for ESI for a payroll tax of 6 percent, rev-
enues of about $430 billion would have been collected. The remaining 
$185–$270 billion would have to come either from increased taxes paid 
by individuals or a combination of individuals and a slightly higher 
payroll tax. 
A SEA CHANGE AND THE NEED TO ACT QUICKLY 
We are in the midst of a sea change in how private health insurance 
is fi nanced for most Americans. The last half of the twentieth century 
was a period when employer-sponsored health insurance grew rapidly 
and became the source of private health insurance for as many as 70 
percent of the nonelderly population. But in the last decade, the propor-
tion of nonelderly with ESI has declined to about 60 percent, and em-
ployers are pulling back from paying for health insurance to the extent 
that they did even just fi ve years ago. The twin forces behind this sea 
change are the global economy and the continuing high rates of increase 
in health care spending and insurance premiums. Looking to the near 
future, it is clear that we need to restructure how we pay for health in-
surance before the economic changes already under way cause a large 
fraction of the nonelderly to become uninsured.
Greater Equity and Effi ciency
The need to restructure how we fi nance health insurance provides 
an opportunity for creating a fi nancing system that is more equitable 
and more effi cient than the current system of ESI and individually pur-
chased coverage. Restructuring the system so everyone would have 
coverage and everyone would pay in proportion to their income is far 
more equitable than what we have now. Currently, whether a person has 
insurance at all and the premium that a person pays depend on where a 
person works, who else works for the company, and a person’s own de-
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mographic characteristics and health history. Restructuring the fi nanc-
ing so a company would pay only a tax rather than being involved in 
negotiating premiums and terms of a policy also is more effi cient for 
employers. Companies would not have to pay for administrative costs 
associated with sponsoring health insurance. They also would not have 
to worry about possible adverse consequences to their premiums of hir-
ing someone who has a medical condition (for example, diabetes or 
asthma). As a result, the labor market would operate more effi ciently.
Restructuring the fi nancing of health insurance also would create a 
safety net for everyone—something that is going to be increasingly im-
portant as the country goes through other signifi cant changes affecting 
our economy and society in the next two decades. The global economy 
is forcing changes on how we manufacture and produce an increas-
ing array of products, putting pressure on pensions and retiree health 
coverage as well as health insurance. The demographic changes and 
longer life expectancies are pushing people to rethink how long they 
need to work to have enough income in retirement. It is increasingly ob-
vious that many Americans do not have suffi cient savings to carry them 
through their old age. This is coming at a time when Medicare is in need 
of a fi nancing restructuring, too. Finally, the age cohorts that are cur-
rently most affected by the lack of health insurance are also cohorts that 
are being squeezed by debts for higher education and the consequences 
of defi cit spending over the past six years. Having a basic level of health 
insurance for everyone would provide a level of security that is going to 
be greatly needed if we are to avoid a general malaise.
Basic Insurance and the Need to Restrain Growth in Spending
The United States is not alone in struggling to slow the rate of in-
crease in health care spending. All of the OECD countries and Japan 
are experiencing similar rates of increases in health care spending. This 
is good for American companies that are competing with companies 
in these countries since their health care costs are increasing at about 
the same rate as those in the United States. But at the same time, the 
similar rates of growth in spending mean that if we are to be successful 
competitors in a global economy, we need to restrain the rate of growth 
in the United States to keep our labor costs competitive. Particularly 
given the diffi cult transitions we are likely facing in the next decade or 
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two, we simply cannot afford to have per capita spending on health care 
continue to rise at rates that far exceed productivity growth. 
One way to restrain growth in medical spending is to fi nance only 
a basic package of health care services. This is the conclusion that the 
European Union countries have reached, although some allow people to 
purchase supplemental coverage if they wish. A basic package of health 
care services could include most if not all of the health care services 
that are now covered by most large companies. But in the future, new 
services would have to be shown to be cost-effective to be included in 
the basic package. This would provide an incentive for innovators to 
look for less costly ways of producing the same service.
Private Insurance Can Be Retained
Restructuring how we pay for health insurance does not have to 
be synonymous with a single-payer, national health insurance system. 
We can still have a system where people choose among private health 
insurance companies just as they do in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land. Financing funds are collected in these countries through a cen-
tral agency, and then premium equivalent funds are sent to the insurers 
selected by individuals. However, in order to compensate insurers for 
enrolling individuals who may be likely to incur higher than average 
medical expenses, we also would want to adjust the premium payments 
for factors known to increase health care spending. As noted earlier, the 
Netherlands has a risk adjustment system that does this, and the risk 
adjustment models are very similar to those developed by Medicare and 
Medicaid for adjusting payments for enrollees who are in managed care 
plans. We also would need to understand more about why there are large 
regional differences in how much medical care people receive—specifi -
cally, how many different types of services are provided. To the extent 
that those differences are meaningful and justifi ed, we also would need 
to adjust premiums on the basis of where one lives.
Finance Restructuring Must Be Done Quickly
The United States is experiencing a sea change in businesses’ atti-
tudes toward their role in fi nancing and organizing health insurance for 
workers. Particularly because of the pressures from the global economy, 
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companies feel they cannot compete if they cannot control spending for 
employee health benefi ts. Given the rapid rate of increase in premiums 
for ESI over the past six years especially, employers have reached a 
level of frustration where they no longer believe they can continue to 
pay for future costs of health coverage. Many also have decided that 
they do not need to offer ESI to attract or retain workers. This slip-
page in business support for ESI is likely to accelerate over the next 
decade, creating a crisis for millions of Americans as well as medical 
care providers. 
This looming crisis could be mitigated or even avoided altogether if 
the country’s public and private policy leaders move now to establish a 
new structure for fi nancing health insurance for the nonelderly who are 
not enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare. There is an urgent need to start 
restructuring the fi nancing—it will take time to agree on the different 
shares that workers, companies, people who are not employed for pay, 
and company stockholders will pay. And in the meantime, the market 
forces that are driving companies to decide they cannot afford to pay 
more for health insurance will continue to pressure businesses. As the 
percentage of companies that offer ESI gets closer to 50 percent, which 
it will within this next decade, we will arrive at a tipping point where 
large numbers of fi rms may choose to stop sponsoring health benefi ts. 
We need to structure a new way of paying for health insurance—with 
the help of business leaders, labor leaders, academics, and public poli-
cymakers—before we reach that tipping point.
America’s challenge in the new global economy is to provide a 
safety net of social services—particularly health insurance—so that 
companies and workers will be able to use their imagination and skills 
to create new products that the world economy will purchase. Sharing 
the fi nancing of these social services more equitably among companies 
and individuals will help ensure growth in the American economy—on 
which a future of good jobs and a strong nation depends.
Notes
I want to thank particularly Susan Houseman, Timothy Bartik, and Frank Levy for 
providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of the chapter; they are not responsible for 
any errors that remain.
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 1.  Given the role that the country’s largest companies—including General Motors—
played in the decade right after World War II in establishing employer-sponsored 
group health insurance rather than supporting national health insurance, there is 
some irony in the leaders of the automotive industry now suggesting that the gov-
ernment should have a large responsibility for health care expenditures.
 2. People who have studied the contingent workforce, including Susan Houseman, 
have raised concerns about the way respondents to the CPS may be answering 
questions about where they work and therefore whether the survey is picking up 
the full extent to which people are working as contract workers or as self-em-
ployed people. 
 3. Congress enacted section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which elimi-
nated confusion arising from a 1953 IRS ruling that seemed to contradict its 1943 
ruling that employer contributions to health insurance policies were tax-exempt. 
 4. In addition, an employer can pay more for ESI and thereby provide something 
more for all employees—but if the employer increases the wages of everyone in 
a certain position or rank, the employer then has to increase the wages of all the 
workers in more senior positions. This can be a far more costly proposition for 
companies. 
 5. Companies may choose to create different premium shares paid by employees 
based on income tiers—so higher-income employees pay more than lower-
income workers—but the premium charged per employee by the insurer is the 
same within policy tier choice. Self-insured employers could set employee shares 
of premiums individually—perhaps on the basis of income, for example—but 
they have been reluctant to do this. One reason may be that companies have long 
stressed that ESI is a group benefi t, and even self-insured fi rms are loathe to break 
the grouping bonds by setting employee shares of premiums that are highly tai-
lored to individual workers’ characteristics.
 6. Note, however, that by shifting more of the lower level of medical expenses onto 
workers, people are bearing more of their medical expenses when they are sick or 
if they have chronic conditions.
 7. Author’s tabulations from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Offi ce of Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Covered Employment 
and Wages (ES-202) data. See also Swartz (2006, Chapter 2, pp. 22–23).
 8. State and local governments’ accounting standards are set by the Governmen-
tal Accounting Standards Board (GASB), which in 2005 adopted rules similar to 
those of FASB. See also Freudenheim and Walsh (2005) and Carroll (2007).
 9. Moreover, as employment growth has been occurring in fi rms that are new com-
panies, a rising fraction of current workers do not have retiree health benefi ts as 
part of their benefi ts. This puts yet more pressure on those companies with aging 
workforces to reduce their labor costs by restricting their own obligations for re-
tiree benefi ts for current workers.
 10. The competition between the Big Three automakers and Toyota America offers 
a stark illustration of these differences. The Big Three contend that when wage, 
health care, retiree health care, and pensions are included, they pay UAW work-
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ers $70–$75 per hour, whereas Toyota and the other Japanese automakers pay 
$40–$45 per hour for cars made at plants in the United States.
 11. Momentum for this shift appears to be growing as rapidly as the shift from defi ned 
benefi t pensions to 401(K) plans a decade ago and the move by employers to 
change their ESI benefi ts from indemnity health insurance plans to managed care 
plans at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.
 12. The highest deductible in 2006 was 500 euros (or about $715) per person. See 
the Royal Netherlands Government (2006). All dollar amounts in this chapter 
are based on the exchange rate as of October 18, 2007, which was $1.43.
 13. Technically, the individuals pay the 6.5 percent tax on their income up to 30,150 
euros, but employers are required to reimburse this amount to their employees.
 14. In 2005, almost 4 million people received this rebate.
 15. Author’s assumption based on approximations from Keehan et al. (2004).   
 16. Author’s calculations from census data contained in DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Lee (2006).
17. Of course, perhaps as many as 40 percent of the people currently uninsured would 
be covered by Medicaid or be fully subsidized for their health insurance premium 
because they are poor or near-poor.
18. We could assume that 22.8 million uninsured with incomes between one and three 
times the poverty level in 2006 would be subsidized on a sliding scale related to 
their incomes. If the average subsidy were $700 per person, such a subsidy would 
cost about $16 billion.
 19. Three issues are particularly likely to cause the tax code to be revised. One is the 
fact that the country now has a large defi cit. The second is that the alternative min-
imum tax (AMT) is not doing what it was intended to do and is instead affecting 
the taxes of increasing numbers of Americans. Third, there is increasing evidence 
that the very highest income earners in the country have benefi ted tremendously 
over the past two decades from the growth in productivity, but that the great bulk 
of people with incomes below the top 5 percent have not gained at all (see Levy 
and Temin 2007). Moreover, the changes in the tax code since 2001 have been 
highly regressive; if made permanent, they will become even more regressive. 
(If the tax cuts become permanent in 2011—as opposed to sunsetting at the end 
of 2010—the burden of federal taxes will shift onto middle-income taxpayers.) 
As the Urban Institute-Brooking Institution’s Tax Policy Center (2006) estimates, 
taxpayers in the top 1 percent of the income distribution would see their share of 
the federal tax burden fall by 0.5 percentage points, while the share paid by house-
holds in the middle of the income distribution would increase by 0.1 percentage 
points. All of this suggests that before 2010, the country will at a minimum repeal 
the tax cuts for the highest income households, and then begin a serious overhaul 
of the tax code.
20. Income from long-term capital gains is taxed at lower rates, as is income from 
dividends (until 2010). The alternative minimum tax (AMT) will become the tax 
system for almost all people with incomes between $200,000 and $500,000 by 
2010 if it is not changed; and the Urban Institute–Brookings Institution’s Tax 
Policy Center (2006) estimates that almost half of all households with incomes 
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between $75,000 and $100,000 will pay the AMT by 2010 unless Congress acts 
to change current law. The AMT is extremely complicated, so comparing ordinary 
income tax rates with the AMT is not meaningful.
  21. The $250 billion for the nine months was 26 percent larger than the amount raised 
a year earlier for the same nine months.
  22. The primary payroll tax collected from companies is the tax for Social Security for 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—what most people call Social Security. 
Employers pay a tax rate of 5.3 percent on earnings up to an annual maximum per 
person ($97,500 in 2007) for the OASI Trust Fund. Workers also pay 5.3 percent 
of their earnings up to the annual maximum so the combined payroll tax paid by 
employers and workers for OASI is 10.6 percent. There is a second Social Secu-
rity payroll tax for the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund; the DI payroll tax is 
0.9 percent, which employers and workers each pay for a combined rate of 1.8 
percent on earnings up to the annual maximum.  
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